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ABSTRACT
Power side-channel attacks are a very effective cryptanalysis
technique that can infer secret keys of security ICs by mon-
itoring a chip’s power consumption. Since the emergence
of practical attacks in the late 90s, they have been a ma-
jor threat to many cryptographic-equipped devices including
smart cards, encrypted FPGA designs, and mobile phones.
Designers and manufacturers of cryptographic devices have
in response developed various countermeasures for protec-
tion. Attacking methods have also evolved to counteract
resistant implementations. This paper reviews foundational
power analysis attack techniques and examines a variety of
hardware design mitigations. The aim is to highlight ex-
posed vulnerabilities in hardware-based countermeasures for
future more secure implementations.
1. INTRODUCTION
Side-channel attack scenarios take advantage of information
leaked from channels other than the main communication
channel and discover small but critical secrets from the leak-
ages. Attacks target chips that incorporate cryptographic
functions in order to reveal the secret keys using side-channel
analysis techniques. Well-known side channels include vari-
ations in execution time, power consumption, and electro-
magnetic emission during different encryption and decryp-
tion steps. Because of the non-invasive properties of side-
channel attacks they are often easy to mount without expen-
sive equipment, and hard to be distinguished from normal
chip operations. Kocher et al., [KJJ99] in 1999 presented
practical approaches to performing power analysis on cryp-
tographic devices. Two kinds of methods were developed
to extract secret keys: Differential Power Analysis (DPA)
and Simple Power Analysis (SPA). The DPA method em-
ploys statistical analysis using many power measurements,
and the SPA is applicable when the leak is so evident that
simple analysis techniques such as visual inspection can dis-
close secrets.
Modern cryptographic ciphers such as AES and RSA are
designed to resist adversaries that supposedly have knowl-
edge of both plaintext and ciphertext data. For example,
to break AES, one must exhaustively enumerate all possi-
ble cryptographic keys which is computationally prohibitive.
The power analysis techniques circumvent such difficulties
by intercepting intermediate values that are calculated for
encryption or decryption processes. The intermediate values
are much shorter in bit length than either the plaintext or
the ciphertext, allowing the adversary to take a divide-and-
conquer strategy to recover portions of the key separately.
Power analysis attacks can be successfully mounted on a va-
riety of cipher implementations. This paper primarily uses
the AES (Advanced Encryption Standard) block cipher as
an example for power analysis discussions due to its wide
adoption. The appendix has an introduction of the AES
round functions and the cipher implementation choices. The
AES standard is specified in [Nat01].
This paper focuses on the differential power analysis be-
cause it is much harder to defend against than the simple
power analysis attacks. The major contribution is to eval-
uate emerging hardware countermeasures that have been
developed since the disclosure of power side channels and
summarize their potential vulnerabilities. The rest of this
paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly introduces the
concept of power traces and how to set up an attack. Sec-
tion 3 reviews basic methods for differential power analysis.
Section 4 surveys the most commonly used power models.
Section 5 presents metrics for evaluating the effectiveness of
attacks or defenses. Section 6 outlines various directions for
mitigations. Section 7 discusses a variety of hardware-based
countermeasures, and section 8 summarizes the paper and
proposes other promising solutions.
2. POWER TRACES
Modern cryptographic algorithms are typically implemented
in an integrated circuit (IC) chip that consists of numer-
ous logic gates composed of CMOS (Complementary Metal-
Oxide Semiconductor) transistors. Transistors switch on
and off to represent the logic function of a gate and these
transitions draw electric current from the chip’s power sup-
ply. The power analysis attack is based on the fact that the
overall chip’s power variation reflects the aggregated switch-
ing activity of each gate.
The first step for power analysis attacks is to acquire one
or more power traces from the target device. A power trace
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Figure 1: An Example Power Trace in [KJJR11]. The ver-
tical line marks the time of the first S-Box output.
(Figure 1) is a digitized sampling sequence of instantaneous
power consumption values over a period when a series of
cryptographic operations take place, for example, the first
round of the AES. Once a power trace has been acquired
some optional digital signal processing can be used to im-
prove the trace quality.
2.1 The Measurement Setup
Many cryptographic chips require a single constant volt-
age supply, e.g., 5V, 3.3V or 1.8V, often denoted as Vdd.
The current drawn from Vdd by the chip is a time-variant
value Idd(t) in Amperes that sinks to the ground lines of the
chip. P (t) = Vdd · Idd(t) describes the instantaneous power
in Watts of the whole chip.
The most commonly used sampling device is an oscilloscope
that measures voltages. A small resistorR is usually inserted
into the Vdd or ground line, and the voltage drop VR across
the resistor is sensed by probes of the oscilloscope and stored.
The voltage drop is proportional to the power consumption:
VR = Idd(t) · R ∝ P (t). Figure 1 shows an example power
trace representing the first round of an AES-128 encryption
on a smart card. From the time marker, it is visible that
there are 16 spikes happening in sequence, indicating the
microcontroller is working on state bytes one after another.
Recorded power traces are represented by the matrix in (1).
P =

P1(1) P1(2) · · · P1(T )
P2(1) P2(2) · · · P2(T )
...
...
. . .
...
PN (1) PN (2) · · · PN (T )
 (1)
In P each row represents one power trace measured within
a period T , for the same sequence of operations performed
on N different sets of data. For example, the first round
of AES-128 encryptions using the same cipher key. The
instantaneous value Pn(t) in the matrix is digitized, and
stored as binary integers. Because of sampling, the time
values represented in the matrix are discrete. One important
property that must be preserved between rows of the matrix
is the time consistency, meaning the values of each column
must preserve the same time offset relative to the start of
sampling.
In practice, many measurement setups have to be carefully
performed to get clear power traces. For example, a highly
stable supply voltage is preferred. The serial resistor should
be inserted close to the target chip’s supply or ground pins,
not the circuit board or device level ones. Modern SoCs
usually have several power supplies for different parts of its
internal structures, which, on the other hand, all share the
same ground. Some chip I/O pins being pulled down are
also electrically grounded and may shunt some amount of
return currents. In such cases, the ground lines are noisier
than the power line that mainly supplies the internal cipher
module. Unless specially noted this paper assumes attacks
are executed in the power line, and higher values of matrix
P indicate higher power consumptions from the source Vdd.
2.2 The Signal Processing
To suppress noise and improve time consistency, optional
signal processing can be performed on the raw power traces.
Noise signals can be filtered by applying appropriate fil-
ters. Time consistency is often preserved by a trigger signal
[KJJR11] that indicates the beginning of certain functions,
for example, the first AES round. This signal can trigger
the oscilloscope to start sampling, and the resulting power
traces will be well aligned. In case such a trigger signal is
not available, trace alignment techniques are employed. A
simple correlation test could be helpful to find the time shift
τ that minimizes the differences between Pi(t) and Pj(t+τ).
Occasionally more complex alignment methods are needed
in the presence of hardware countermeasures [CCD00] or for
a very noisy device such as a smartphone [NSN+14]. The
power trace matrix shown in (1) can be considered as filtered
and aligned, and each row corresponds to the encryption
process for one data block of 16 bytes.
3. DIFFERENTIAL POWER ANALYSIS
The first differential power analysis introduced by [KJJ99]
uses a method called Difference of Means (DoM). Later ver-
sions using more effective statistical tools have been devel-
oped to improve the performance of differential power anal-
ysis. One easy to mount and very powerful attack calculates
correlation coefficients and thus it is often called the correla-
tion power analysis (CPA). This section mainly introduces
these two methods because hardware countermeasures of-
ten use them for the evaluations. A few advanced attacking
techniques are also briefly introduced.
3.1 Difference of Means
The differential power analysis published by [KJJ99] tar-
geted a DES (Data Encryption Standard) cipher, and later
the same authors extended their work to AES [KJJR11].
They introduced a known-plaintext attack: the adversary
has a set of plaintext data, encrypted by an AES cipher us-
ing the same secret cipher key. For each plaintext input,
the adversary can observe a power trace and for all the N
inputs (e.g. 4,000 in [KJJR11]) the power traces are stored
in a matrix like P. Each power trace represents the encryp-
tion of a data block of 16 bytes (Figure 1). In this scenario,
the ciphertext can be used at the end to verify the correct-
ness of the key recovered, but for the extraction process the
ciphertext is not used.
Observations show that the power trace values sampled at a
specific point in time (a column of the power trace matrix) is
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Figure 2: The Power Consumption Distribution at the Time
Marker of Figure 1
close to a normal distribution. Figure 2 shows the distribu-
tion at the time of the first S-Box output in the initial AES
round. The distribution is a combined effect caused by all
switching transistors of the chip and electronic noises. Now
suppose the cipher key is known then the statistical analyze
is as follows. For each data input, the result after the first
AddRoundKey and SubBytes can be calculated. Then ac-
cording to one arbitrary bit of the output, for example, the
least significant bit (LSB), separate the power traces into
two subsets. One subset has the traces where the LSB is 0,
and the other has traces where the LSB equals 1. Now the
distributions of the two subsets are still close to normal but
with distinguishable means, shown in Figure 3.
The way to separate traces is known as the selection func-
tion (2) for DoM based attacks. The reason for the differ-
ence of means is circuit design details make it possible for
either LSB value to consume more power when data is being
processed. Switching to the attack scenario, the adversary,
without knowing the cipher key, can do exhaustive testing of
all key hypotheses, and each time use the hypothetical LSB
to separate power traces into two subsets. Then the adver-
sary calculates the difference of means as in equation (3).
When the key guess is correct, the difference of the subsets’
means usually stands out as shown in Figure 3. Even if the
difference is very small, it will become statistically significant
given a sufficient number of power traces (large N values in
matrix P). If the key guess is not correct, each subset is
essentially a random sampling of the full distribution and
their DoM often vanishes as the number of trace increases.
F (dn, xk) = LSB( S(dn ⊕ xk) ) (2)
In equation (2) and (3), S(·) indicates the SubBytes func-
tion, dn represents one data byte of the initial state of the n
th
power trace, and xk (k ∈ [1 · · · 256]) is a guessed round key
byte corresponding to dn. The ∆P¯ (t) is known as the differ-
ential trace, and the predicted byte xkˆ of the first round key
is chosen by the greatest difference of means at certain time
tˆ. Thus, a successful attack also reveals the time tˆ when the
key byte xkˆ is used. The same DPA process is repeated for
each key byte independently. Because this attack scenario
targets the S-Box output of the first round, the recovered
round key is also the predicted cipher key.
Figure 3: Distributions of the Two Subsets at the Time
Marker of Figure 1
∆P¯ (t) =
∑N
n=1 F (dn, xk) · Pn(t)∑N
n=1 F (dn, xk)
−
∑N
n=1(1− F (dn, xk)) · Pn(t)∑N
n=1(1− F (dn, xk))
(3)
(kˆ, tˆ) = argmax
(k,t)
|∆P¯ (t)| (4)
Mounted DPA attacks, in practice, are often more complex.
The target bit does not have to be the LSB, and different
bits could have varying degrees of leakages. There could also
be more than one guess that leads to equally strong spikes
in the differential trace, and a decision based on equation
(4) is hard to make. The false spikes caused by incorrect
key bytes are termed as harmonics or ghost peaks, which
are essentially caused by several key hypotheses all corre-
late to the chosen bit. Nevertheless, such a simple method
worked devastatingly well on many smart cards when the
paper [KJJ99] was published. Later methods have evolved
to make great improvements in this classical DPA technique.
3.2 Correlation Coefficient
The correlation power analysis [BCO04] introduced by Brier
et al., was the first to explicitly use the correlation coeffi-
cient (also known as the Pearson Product-Moment Correla-
tion Coefficient) to make decisions among key hypotheses.
To deploy a correlation analysis, the adversary needs to build
a hypothetical power consumption matrix H, for every key
guess in {x1, x2, · · · , xK} (K = 256 in case only one key byte
is targeted in one attacking attempt). In H, each column is
calculated using one value of xk, and the entry Hn(k) is a
modeled power value estimated by using a plaintext byte dn
and the hypothetical key byte xk.
H =

H1(1) H1(2) · · · H1(K)
H2(1) H2(2) · · · H2(K)
...
...
. . .
...
HN (1) HN (2) · · · HN (K)
 (5)
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Rk(t) =
∑N
n=1(Hn(k)− H¯(k)) · (Pn(t)− P¯ (t))√∑N
n=1(Hn(k)− H¯(k))2 ·
∑N
n=1(Pn(t)− P¯ (t))2
with : H¯(k) =
∑N
n=1Hn(k)
N
, P¯ (t) =
∑N
n=1 Pn(t)
N
(6)
Therefore, the computing of Hn(k) depends on how the ad-
versary models the power consumptions according to the
cipher’s intermediate values. The paper [BCO04] suggested
a Hamming Distance model, which is the count of differ-
ent bits between two bit-vectors. The model could target
the state register of the AES cipher, and assumes its power
consumption has a linear relationship with the number of
flipped bits between two successive states. For the known-
plaintext attack scenario, the two successive state values can
be the results of AddRoundKey and SubBytes in the first
round. Hence Hn(k) is computed by the Hamming distance
between (dn ⊕ xk) and S(dn ⊕ xk).
(kˆ, tˆ) = argmax
(k,t)
|Rk(t)| (7)
The correlation coefficient Rk(t) ([−1.0, 1.0]) between each
column H(k) of H and each column P(t) of P is computed
as in (6). The greatest value of |Rkˆ(tˆ)| given by (7) predicts
the secret key byte xkˆ and the time tˆ of its leakage.
The explained DPA and CPA approaches are suitable for a
known-plaintext scenario. For encryption power traces with
ciphertext-only, the attacking process needs to be adjusted.
For example, the target intermediate value becomes the last
round S-Box input, and the attacker tries to predict the last
round key. Since the key expansion for AES-128 is invertible
with any round key, having the last round key also reveals
the cipher key. Similar attack flows can be derived for the
decryption process as well. The first or the last round of
the block cipher is often targeted by DPA because the data
complication is sufficiently weak for some of the intermediate
values to be easily enumerated. It is possible that an attack
does not uniquely predict a key, or the most likely choice
is not the right one. In such cases, a list of candidates can
be supplied to some key enumeration and validation steps.
Nevertheless, the attack results should have reduced the re-
maining brute-force effort to feasible levels.
3.3 Advanced Power Analysis Attacks
Since the debut of practical power analysis attacks, many
evolved approaches have been proposed to improve either
DPA or SPA. For instance, the selection function for the
DoM method can assign weights to different traces or divide
traces into more than two categories. Using functions other
than the ordinary averaging could be useful when data sets
have unusual statistical distributions. Brief introductions
about a few other major improvements to power analysis
techniques are as follows.
Higher-Order DPA: The attacks introduced in the pre-
vious section only analyze the statistics of samples at one
point in time, i.e., correlate H(k) with each column of P in-
dependently. This is known as the first-order attack. [KJJ99]
also introduced higher-order DPA that works on samples at
multiple times within P and their cross-correlations. The at-
tacking order is roughly the number of intermediate values
of different time being considered in one attack. Practical
results ([Mes00] and [OMHT06]) have reported that higher-
order attacks can compromise implementations with certain
countermeasures.
Collision Attacks: A collision attack [SLFP04] requires a
pair of encryption runs with two known and different inputs.
It checks if the two encryption runs compute some equal in-
termediate values, known as intermediate value collisions.
The essential idea is that for two different inputs, a collision
cannot occur for all key values, but only for a limited subset
of keys. Hence, the collisions reduce the guessing space and
possibly uniquely identify the cipher key. Adversaries using
this attacking method may prefer to choose some plaintext
inputs for efficient collision detection, and such a scenario
is called the chosen-plaintext attack. In practice, one pair
of chosen plaintexts might only allow the recovery of one
key byte. A few more measurements are required to pre-
dict the whole cipher key, but the number of required power
traces is usually significantly reduced. Enhanced collision
attack using correlation analysis has also been developed by
[MME10].
Profiled Attacks: This series of attacking methods aim to
solve the problem when only one or two power traces of the
victim device are observable. The template attack [CRR03]
builds an accurate power consumption model using an iden-
tical or similar device as the victim. The attack consists
of two steps. First a profiling phase is performed by pre-
cisely characterizing power traces as a multivariate normal
distribution. Next during the on-site attack a key extrac-
tion phase is executed using the available templates and key
hypothesis testing on a single power trace observed from
a victim device. The researchers successfully used the tem-
plate attack to break an RC4 stream cipher and a DES block
cipher. Schindler et al., [SLP05] introduced the stochastic
models for the device profiling. It achieves the efficiency of
the template attack in the key extraction phase but requires
far fewer measurements in the profiling phase.
Algebraic Side-Channel Attacks: The algebraic side-
channel attack [RS10] combines template attacks and alge-
braic cryptanalysis. Besides building templates, it also ex-
ploits the information leakage of many cipher rounds (not
limited to the first or last round) to build a boolean satis-
fiability problem to solve. The authors managed to break
a PRESENT block cipher with the observation of a single
power trace. A later improved version [MBZ+12] also suc-
cessfully attacked an AES-128 implementation.
4. POWER MODELS
Most power side-channel attacks exploit the linear relations
between the observed power traces and the hypothetical
power consumption that is dependent on intermediate values
the circuitry processes. Analysis of transistor-based logic
gates reveals a clear dependency between its output value
and the power it consumes. Figure 4 illustrates a basic
CMOS inverter gate and simplified models of its transition
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Figure 4: CMOS Inverter Transitions
activities. Its power consumption includes three parts: the
static power1, Pstatic , the short-circuit power, Pshort and the
switching power, Pswitch . The sum of the latter two compo-
nents is also known as the dynamic power Pdyn. According
to [RE10], the semiconductor technology used for the fab-
rication of smart card microcontrollers lies in the range of
0.18-µm to 90-nm. And the dominant factor of power con-
sumption for a technology node in this range is the dynamic
power [MSSE09]. This paper only considers the dynamic
power, since most power side-channel attacks rely on this
portion. Attack results based on sub-threshold power are
still preliminary [Mor14].
The capacitor CL in Figure 4 is a lumped model including
the transistor’s intrinsic capacitance, its load capacitance,
and the parasitic capacitance of the interconnections. When
its output switches from 0 to 1, CL gets charged by a cur-
rent from Vdd. The switching power the gate consumes is
proportional to α · f · CL · V 2dd, where α is the active factor
of 0 → 1 transitions in one clock cycle, and f is the clock
frequency of the circuit. When the output switches from 1
to 0, CL discharges and ideally there are no current flows
from the power supply. However in both 0 → 1 and 1 → 0
transitions there is a momentary short-circuit current flow-
ing from Vdd to the ground when both the transistors are
conducting. The 0 → 0 and 1 → 1 transitions do not incur
power variations if not considering the sub-threshold cur-
rent. Accordingly, if measure the power consumption in the
Vdd line, 0→ 1 transitions contribute the most, and then the
1 → 0 cases. Now consider an AND which computes y = a · b
and its switching activity shown in Table 1 (just the a, b,
and AND columns). Given a uniform distribution of switching
probabilities for a and b, obviously the probabilities for the
four output switching activities are not uniform anymore.
Assume a is a fixed secret bit (like a key) and b is a random
bit (like a plaintext or ciphertext). If a is 0 (i.e., the four 0
→ 0 rows of a), y has neither 0 → 1 nor 1 → 0 switching;
otherwise if a is 1, y has one 0→ 1 and one 1→ 0 switching
(i.e., in the four 1 → 1 rows of a). Therefore, by knowing
b and monitoring the mean power consumption of the AND
gate it is possible to deduce what value a has. In contrast,
the XOR function still has uniform output switching activities
and does not easily reveal the value of a in this way.
Scaling up this simple example, a whole cryptographic cir-
cuit’s power consumption is the aggregation of power con-
sumed by all its logic gates. For AES, the AddRoundKey
function can be implemented only using XOR gates, but the fi-
nite field inversion of the S-Box must employ logic functions
1The static power is also called the sub-threshold leakage
power. To avoid confusion with the information leakage in
this context, this paper refers to it as the static or just sub-
threshold power.
like AND or OR ([WOL02]). Hence power analysis attacks
work and often favor the S-Box because of the distortions in
the odds of switching activities make distinguishable power
profiles between the right and wrong key guesses. With a
chosen power analysis method, e.g., the CPA, the quality
of mapping intermediate values to power consumptions has
an important impact on its effectiveness. This section gives
a brief survey of commonly used mapping methods, also
known as the power models.
Single Bit: Power modeling using a single bit is the most
basic approach based on the principle explained using the
AND gate. Nevertheless, its effectiveness had been proved by
the classical DoM based DPA attacks. Different target bits
have been observed showing a different amount of leakages.
The differences root from variations in data paths that sig-
nals travel along, and the ghost peak phenomena happen
because multiple keys can correlate to the same bit.
Hamming Weight: The Hamming weight power model is
a multi-bit extension of the single bit model. The weight
is simply the number of 1s in a bit vector. For this model
to work effectively, it should assume all the bits are in a
constant state (either all 0s or all 1s) before a target value
appears. Therefore the Hamming weight of an intermediate
value is roughly linear to the power consumed to process
it. Messerges et al., [Mes00] first introduced this model
to power analysis attacks and found the fact that many
smart card processors around that time (year 2000) pre-
cisely exhibited these characteristics. The reason is many
microcontrollers precharge their buses before carry the real
data, and this even leads to simple MOV instructions leak
the Hamming weights of their operands [MS00]. Leakage of
Hamming weight is especially severe for look-up table based
S-Box implementations because the I/O ports of memories
usually have much higher capacitance than other cells.
Hamming Distance: The Hamming distance is the count
of different bits in two bit-vectors, and the model was first
used by the correlation power analysis in [BCO04]. It does
not require a priori state of all 0s or all 1s before the tar-
get value appears. But it supposes the adversary to guess
two successive values of a register to calculate the Ham-
ming distance between them. The CPA attack using the Ad-
dRoundKey and the SubBytes outputs exemplifies its use.
It assumes 0 → 1 and 1 → 0 transitions equally contribute
to the power consumption. Though still not very accurate,
its applicability has been proved by many practical attacks
and widely used as a generic power model.
Switching Distance: Peeters et al., [PSQ07] introduced a
power model called the switching distance. It exploits the
fact that 0 → 1 and 1 → 0 transitions draw a different
amount of current from the supply. For an inverter, a 0 →
1 switching draws some current from the Vdd for charging
the CL and the short-circuit effect while during a 1 → 0
switching only some short-circuit current appears. Hence,
the switching distance is defined as a tunable factor δ, in-
dicating the power consumption difference between 0 → 1
and 1 → 0 transitions.
Toggle Count: The above models are good approximations
for registers that usually change states only once in a clock
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cycle. Mangard et al., [MPO05] noted the fact that glitches
in combinational circuits are the dominant factor of power
consumptions in a clock cycle. Glitches are unwanted out-
put toggles before it settles due to different arrival times of
input signals and the gate’s function. Therefore, this model
evaluates the number of gate toggles in the S-Box circuit
instead of its final output. It works the best on hardware-
arithmetic based S-Box implementations due to the complex
combinational data paths. The model supposes the attacker
knows certain design details of the cipher, for example, the
gate-level circuit netlist, and builds an accurate power model
using circuit simulations.
Power Simulation: More accurate modeling of the CMOS
gates is obtained by advanced power simulation. Commer-
cial IC design tools provide power simulation capabilities
at different levels. From high to low, simulations can be
categorized into behavioral, netlist, layout and analog lev-
els. Accordingly in the same order the simulation requires
greater details of the IC design and hence provides more
accurate results.
Profiled Model: The profiling of template and stochastic
attacks can be viewed as power modeling as well. Differ-
ent from hypothetical modeling, the profiling utilizes real
measurements performed an identical or similar device as
the victim. While other attack forms consider noises as
hindrance, profiled attacks precisely model noises as well.
The probability distributions of noises using different cryp-
tographic keys are characterized during the profiling. Power
side-channel analysis usually considers profiled attacks as
the strongest form.
The power consumption values predicted by hypothetical
models do not have to be in Watts as long as they preserve
a (partial) linear relationship to the actual data-dependent
power. It is reasonable that the better a model fits the
actual power consumption of the chip, the more effective
an attack becomes, and obviously better power modeling
requires more knowledge of the adversary about the victim
device. A comparative study in [MBMT13] showed that a
Hamming weight model failed while the Hamming distance
and switching distance models succeeded in the same CPA
attack setup. Advanced power models such as toggle counts
and power simulations are not infeasible since present time
witnesses a growth in open-source hardware and hardware as
IP businesses. It would be a difficult problem to distinguish
benign and malicious users.
5. METRICS
Fair evaluation methods for side-channel attacks and coun-
termeasures are useful to compare their quality. The most
commonly used metric for attacks and countermeasures is
the number of power traces, i.e., the value N of P. How-
ever this metric is subject to the power monitoring method,
the quality of tools and the effectiveness of attacks. Man-
gard et al., [MOP08] developed a more analytical way to
evaluate the vulnerability of a device to power analysis at-
tacks. They model the power consumption as the sum of
the exploitable power Pexp, the switching noise Psw.noise,
the electronic noise Pel.noise, and the constant component
Pconst. The four components are independent of each other,
and their effects are additive.
Ptotal = Pexp + Psw.noise + Pel.noise + Pconst (8)
The Pexp is the component that depends on intermediate
values (e.g., an S-Box output during an encryption) that
the attacker is looking for, or, in other words, the power
that relates to secrets. The exploitable power is intrinsic
to a cipher implementation and independent of attacking
methods. For attackers, they try to use power models to ap-
proximate Pexp, and from the defensive perspective this Pexp
should be carefully evaluated and minimized. The switch-
ing noise Psw.noise results from transistor switches that are
independent of the sensitive values, for example, another
processor core doing irrelevant tasks. The electronic noise
Psw.noise describes variations caused either internal or ex-
ternal sources. The Pconst is the constant part such as the
static power of the cryptographic IC. Given an attack sce-
nario, the signal-to-noise ratio is defined by (9), and the
V ar(·) function calculates the variances of its operand.
SNR =
V ar(Signal)
V ar(Noise)
=
V ar(Pexp)
V ar(Psw.noise + Pel.noise)
(9)
The researchers also derive the correlation coefficient Rk(t)
in terms of Pexp and the SNR as equation (10). The ρ(X,Y )
function calculates the correlation coefficient ([−1.0, 1.0]) of
two random variables.
Rk(t) = ρ(H(k),P(t)) =
ρ(H(k), Pexp)√
1 + 1
SNR
(10)
The SNR is independent of the power model used by an at-
tacker while the ρ(H(k), Pexp) is dependent on the power
model, and it describes how well an attacker approximates
the Pexp. Equation (10) gives several directions for defend-
ing correlation-based attacks, and the goal is to make Rk(t)
approaching zero so that adversaries do not easily get con-
clusive predictions. Apparently a weak correlation between
H(k) and Pexp, or strong noises both reduce the amplitude
of Rk(t), and consequently it becomes difficult for an ad-
versary to predict the right key. Usually, a lot more power
trace measurements are needed in case of a low SNR. Their
exact relations still depend on practical details.
Standaert et al., [SMY09] developed improved security met-
rics using some information theoretic concepts. A few popu-
lar variations have been adopted by the DPA Contest2 which
is an online benchmark for power side-channel attacks. In
the Non-Invasive Attack Testing Workshop host by NIST in
2011, Goodwill et al., [GJJ+11] introduced a leakage detec-
tion method called the T-Test. It uses a statistical hypothe-
sis testing method to detect if one or some sensitive interme-
diate values can influence the measurement data. Hardware
countermeasure evaluations have not been widely using the
new metrics and so this survey does not discuss them in
detail. Subsequent sections still use the number of power
2www.dpacontest.org
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traces because they appear the most commonly in publi-
cations. However, unless the numbers are from the same
authors and the same measurement setup, they should not
be considered as a precise metric for the effectiveness of cor-
responding countermeasures.
6. OVERVIEW OF COUNTERMEASURES
Ideally, making the cryptographic device physically secure
or frequently changing keys should be the most effective
countermeasures for side-channel attacks. However, such
mitigations are difficult to guarantee in a large number of
cases. For example, an encrypted secret is shipped to an
adversarial user with the decryption key hardened in the de-
vice (e.g., an encrypted FPGA design). Or a strong attack
already reveals the key before its session expires (e.g., an
authentication smart card). Aggressive physical shielding is
often difficult for compact devices to adopt. Therefore, it is
strongly desired for the cryptographic circuit to have intrin-
sic fail-safe solutions in case it is in the hands of adversaries.
Power side-channel attacks work because the power con-
sumption of a cryptographic device is dependent on its pro-
cessed intermediate values, as indicated by the Pexp. Such
data dependencies are amplified by the non-linear functions
of modern ciphers, for example, the AES S-Box. The S-Box
was designed to resist conventional linear cryptanalysis. But
experimental results of Guilley et al., in [GHP04] showed
the paradox that the better protected against linear crypto-
graphic attacks a block cipher is, the more vulnerable it is
to differential power analysis. Prouff also formally proved in
[Pro05] the resistance of an S-Box to DPA attacks and the
classical cryptographic criteria, such as high non-linearity,
cannot be satisfied simultaneously.
Hence, one obvious goal of counteracting techniques is to
eliminate such power-data dependencies, especially around
the non-linear cipher functions. One idea is to perform
computations in a way such that different data processing
consumes the equal amount of power. Such techniques are
known as hiding, which brings down V ar(Pexp) (SNR → 0).
Thus for all key hypotheses the correlation coefficients Rk(t)
are close to zero and not conclusive. The capability to bal-
ance power consumptions is limited for software. Hardware
design can effectively modify a chip’s power characteristics
at various levels.
In practice, the data dependency can not be completely re-
moved, and then according to the SNR definition another
direction for mitigation is to increase the variance of the
amplitude noise. Noise can be achieved by on-chip noise
generation, including excessive switching noises and elec-
tronic noises. Hardware implementations using wide data
paths (e.g., parallel S-Boxes) for cryptographic algorithms
are example approaches to increase switching noises. The
added noises also do not completely hide the exploitable
power component, but they can fairly complicate an attack.
Programmers can increase noise by executing parallel ac-
tivities to the cryptographic functions. But doing multiple
tasks in software is often limited by the cost and footprint
constraints on many security ICs.
Masking, also known as secret sharing, is a general counter-
measure for both software and hardware that randomizes the
intermediate values while still keeps the input and output of
a cipher the same as the unmasked version. For example,
in the AES encryption algorithm, the plaintext and the key
are added or multiplied with random values, i.e., the masks.
The transformations of masks through round functions are
tracked, and before the ciphertext output the masking ef-
fect is removed properly. Consequently, it becomes diffi-
cult for adversaries to correlate the Pexp using hypothetical
power models (ρ(H(k), Pexp)→ 0). Masking techniques can
apply to the algorithmic level without changing the power
consumption characteristics of the cryptographic hardware,
and therefore it is very commonly used in software. The
same algorithmic masking can be ported to hardware, and
besides algorithmic masking, hardware design also utilizes
gate-level masking. Because masking is suitable for multi-
ple design levels, there is a large body of research literature
on this topic. This survey will focus on gate-level masking
in the next section.
Another technique that is implicit in the SNR expression
is to break the trace alignment effectively (see Section 2.2),
and therefore it prevents attackers from building a mean-
ingful power trace matrix. The software can implement this
countermeasure can be implemented by inserting random
number of dummy instructions before and after protected
functions, or shuffling the execution order of S-Boxes for
every data block. Hardware design can adopt similar tech-
niques. Effects that cause trace misalignment is also called
temporal noise for attacks.
Usually, a cipher implemented in hardware is more resistant
to power analysis attacks than its software version. Mi-
croprocessors are often highly pipelined and equipped with
a data bus that consumes the majority part of the whole
chip’s dynamic power. Simple power models such as Ham-
ming weight and Hamming distance often fairly represent
the exploitable power of their cipher implementations. The
parallel nature of hardware, complex data paths, and ir-
regular transistor toggles in one clock cycle all increase the
attacking effort. Mangard et al., [MOP08] designed an AES
core in ASIC using four parallel S-Boxes and found it took
significantly more effort to attack the hardware than the
software counterpart on an 8051 microcontroller.
Complex SoCs and devices may not be more resistant to
power side-channel attacks than a small chip. Successful
side-channel attacks mounted to modern smartphone pro-
cessors3 are demonstrated by [JK12] and [NSN+14]. A large
design usually has many power and ground pins surround-
ing the chip. Some of the supply pins are close or dedi-
cated to a security circuit, and thus a quality measurement
can be done with these pins. Even worse, for power effi-
ciency and hence usability, contemporary large-scale chips
must use power gating techniques to shut down unwanted
switching of transistors. From a security perspective these
techniques effectively turn off switching noises and leave the
running cryptographic module as vulnerable as in a small
chip. Therefore appropriate countermeasures must also be
employed cryptographic circuits of large-scale SoCs as well.
3These two cases actually use electromagnetic signals for
attacking but the principle of leakage is similar to the power
side-channel, both induced by rapidly changing currents.
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7. HARDWARE COUNTERMEASURES
Hardware design can effectively implement a variety of coun-
termeasures. Since power consumption properties can be
largely changed in hardware design, many approaches have
been trying to conceal the real activities of the protected
circuit. This section first introduces logic gate masking, fol-
lowed by the dual-rail precharge logic that intends to equal-
ize power consumption for all switching activities. Gate
masking and dual-rail/precharge designs often combine to
take merits of both. Other techniques such as power line
isolation, noise generation and randomized dynamic voltage
and frequency scaling have also been proposed to thwart
DPA attacks.
7.1 Masked Logic
Alternative to masking at algorithmic level is the use of
masked logic gates so that at the gate-level no values stored
in hardware are correlated to secret intermediate values.
The basic idea of gate masking is to mask properly a gate’s
input and output signals and never let the true secret val-
ues expose until the final output. For example, a regular
2-input AND gate (y = a · b) is transformed to a 5-input (am,
ma, bm, mb, my), 2-output (ym, my) Masked-AND [Tri03]
as shown in Figure 5 and equation (11). The ma, mb, and
my are random 1-bit masks that can be either equal or dif-
ferent. In the same manner, other basic gates can be con-
verted into masked versions and consequently any circuit can
be built using masked gates. Ishai et al., [ISW03] formally
proved that any logic circuit can transform into correspond-
ing securely masked versions. Before entering the masked
circuit inputs like a and b are masked as am = a⊕ma and
bm = b ⊕ mb (remember that XOR functions are not easily
attacked by DPA). Masked values and mask bits propagate
together along the circuitry (e.g., one AES round) and at the
end of the protected computing the true values are recovered
by removing masks (e.g., y = ym ⊕my).
ym = am · bm ⊕ (ma · bm ⊕ (mb · am ⊕ (ma ·mb ⊕my)))
with : am = a⊕ma, bm = b⊕mb, ym = y ⊕my
(11)
Figure 5: The Masked AND Gate
Compared to algorithmic masking, masking at gate level
does not have to consider the higher level functions of using
logic gates. Given a cryptographic circuit implemented by
regular gates, masked gates can be swapped for them to form
a less leaky version, at a cost of increased gate count and
extra power consumption. Standard logic synthesis tools do
not well support this design flow, whose primary goals are
usually optimizing timing and area. Therefore, additional
effort is required for the functional and timing verification
of the masked gate netlist.
Masking is a mathematically provable securing scheme with-
out considering real hardware behaviors. It effectively hides
dependencies between the secret data and settled final val-
ues of gate outputs, and counteracts basic power models
such as the Hamming weight and the Hamming distance
because such attacks also just consider the final values. Un-
fortunately, the real hardware is complicated, and a masked
design often overlooks glitches caused by the different ar-
rival times of input signals to logic gates. It is obvious that
the masked gate in Figure 5 has severely unbalanced sig-
nal paths, and worse variations may already exist before
they enter the first level of the masked layers. Consequently
some unwanted glitches appear at the output before the final
value settles, and they are found correlated to the secret key
values. Mangard et al., [MPG05] demonstrated that simply
masked gates are vulnerable to attacks using the more pre-
cise toggle count power model. A formal explanation of how
glitches leak information is given by Nikiva et al., [NRR06].
Masking methods, including algorithmic masks, are also sus-
ceptible to various advanced DPA attacks, such as higher-
order DPA ([Mes00]), template attack ([ARRS05]), and al-
gebraic side-channel attack ([RS10]. These attacks exploit
multiple intermediate values in a power trace and cross-
correlate them to remove the effect of masks. On the other
hand higher-order masking methods ([RP10]) have been pro-
posed to counteract higher-order power analysis. The mask-
ing order is determined by how many independent data
shares are needed to represent the true secret value. If the
number of shares is d + 1, e.g., X =
⊕d+1
i=1 xi, the scheme
is known as the dth -order masking. For example a masked
gate’s output y is split into two shares, i.e., ym and my;
this is called a first-order masking. A dth -order masking is
supposed to resist a dth -order attack. Higher-order mask-
ing is difficult for efficiently hardware implementations and
flaws [CPRR14] are also found due to over complex designs.
Although simple masking is often not enough to prevent suc-
cessful attacks, it certainly increases the difficulty level and
usually achieves better resistance when combined with other
countermeasures.
7.2 Dual-Rail Precharge (DRP) Logic
The DRP logic cells are designed to make output switching
activities independent of inputs to achieve constant power
consumptions at the gate level. In a dual-rail gate, logic 0
and 1 are represented by complementary pairs (0, 1) and
(1, 0) respectively. The precharge state is defined by (0,
0), but (1, 1) is not a valid circuit state. The promise is
exactly the same count of 0 → 1 and 1 → 0 transitions ap-
pear per gate and per clock cycle, regardless of the input
activity. The last four columns of Table 1 describes switch-
ing activities of a dynamic (AND, NAND) pair. The shaded
transitions occur when a precharge signal asserts and the
unshaded ones happen when the it de-asserts. In dynamic
CMOS logic design, the second step is the evaluation phase.
Classical dual-rail domino logic gates satisfy the desired pat-
tern of switching. But one essential design metric is to en-
sure all charging and discharging paths have the same ca-
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Table 1: Switching Activities of Gates. For dynamic gates
the shaded column indicates the precharge phase.
pacitance. Tiri et al., [TAV02] reported the earliest design
of DRP cells in academia for counteracting DPA attacks.
On the basis of (modified) dual-rail domino logic, their solu-
tion is to use a pair of cross-coupled inverters for capacitance
balancing, shown in Figure 6. Since the cross-coupled invert-
ers are also known as a sense amplifier, this transistor-level
DRP cell design is called Sense Amplifier Based Logic
(SABL). An SABL cell has the following advantages: 1)
outputs switching activities independent of inputs, 2) im-
munity to glitches, and 3) balanced internal capacitances.
The immunity to glitches is because during the precharge
phase all outputs only monotonically fall, and in the evalu-
ation phase the outputs can only monotonically rise (nature
of dynamic logic). However, a design based on SABL cells
still has to balance external loads and especially the par-
asitics on routing wires. To relax the routing constraint, a
Three-Phase Dual-Rail Pre-Charge Logic (TDPL) [BGLT06]
was developed, by enforcing an additional discharge4 phase
after the evaluation. Consequently in TDPL either differ-
ential output exactly charges once and discharges once. As
a result, unbalanced external load capacitance has a much
lower effect.
The SABL design does achieve nearly constant power con-
sumption in circuit simulation but it requires a tedious and
expensive full-custom IC design flow, especially for its dy-
namic logic. Consequently, many later developments of DRP
cells intend to use static CMOS standard cells to emulate
the switching activities of SABL cells. Tiri et al., [TV04]
also introduced the Wave Dynamic Differential Logic
(WDDL) that is compatible with standard cell based semi-
custom ASIC design. The authors first demonstrated a Sim-
ple Dynamic Differential Logic (SDDL) built by basic static
CMOS gates of a standard cell library to emulate the dual-
rail precharge behavior. An SDDL AND gate is illustrated in
Figure 7. The dual gate to the AND, the OR gate, is derived
4Depending on different nodes for circuit analysis, the
precharge or discharge could lead to either 0 or 1. Look-
ing at the outputs of gates, precharge drops all outputs to 0
but discharge brings them to 1.
Figure 6: The SABL AND Gate
using the De Morgan’s law: a · b = a+ b; and their outputs
are AND-ed with the precharge signal. To avoid glitching,
the dual-rail functions must implement positive monotonic
gates (outputs always swing in the same direction as inputs).
The original publication [TV04] only allows the AND and the
OR gates5. Inversion is inherent in a dual-rail logic gate by
swapping the two outputs.
Figure 7: The SDDL AND Gate
Protected
Circuit
Precharge Input
Figure 8: The WDDL Encryption Module Design
By virtue of the positive monotonic gates, the precharge sig-
nal does not have to be globally distributed to every com-
binational gate. During the precharge phase, the inputs of
any compound gate are precharged to logic 0s and any AND
or OR gate outputs logic 0 as well. Accordingly, the two AND
gates at the output stage of an SDDL gate are removed, and
the precharge signal (logic 0) can propagate like a wave to
all combinational gates and stop at clocked flip-flops. Hence
comes the name WDDL. The precharge waves are launched
from register cells as shown in Figure 8. Inverting gates are
not allowed along the way because they halt the 0-waves.
A WDDL gate has the same switching activity as in SABL.
But one good property that WDDL loses is the balanced
5Any boolean logic can be implemented with the AND, OR,
and INV operators.
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internal capacitance: the AND and OR gates that compose a
WDDL gate are not equal. Therefore, in general not all in-
ternal nodes of a WDDL gate are charged and discharged
in the same way. The authors argue that with technology
shrinking the interconnection capacitance is more dominant,
and the focus should be on routing balance.
Although a WDDL design can be implemented using ex-
isting standard cells, normal IC design tools still do not
natively support it. Suppose a cryptographic circuit is de-
signed by hardware description languages (Verilog or VHDL),
the designer first has to restrict the use of target cells to only
AND, OR and INV. Once have the synthesized cell netlist, a
custom script is executed to replace each gate by its WDDL
counterpart and remove inverters by exchanging the out-
puts. From the gate netlist to the physical layout strict
design constraints must be applied, especially for differen-
tial wire routing. The constraints for routing the differential
wires include but are not limited to the follows [TV06]: 1)
always on the same metal layers, 2) always on adjacent rout-
ing tracks, 3) always have the same lengths and widths, 4)
always have the same number of vias for resistance balanc-
ing, 5) must be shielded with Vdd or ground lines to remove
crosstalk, 6) making every other metal layer a ground plane
to control the inter-layer capacitance. Therefore, the design-
ers have to force commercial IC design tools in many ways
to meet the physical design constraints. In each design iter-
ation, parasitic capacitance analysis must be rigorous per-
formed. Moreover, due to custom editing of the gate netlist,
formal verification and timing closure require greater effort
than in a normal IC design. For FPGAs, the constraints are
even harder to meet than the ASIC case due to the limited
degree of freedom in the FPGA physical design.
An SoC6 [TV06] using WDDL design as its AES portion
was fabricated using a TSMC 0.18-µm process. On the same
chip, an insecure AES counterpart exists as well, compris-
ing regular standard cells and regular physical design rules.
Both parts have been implemented starting from the same
synthesized gate netlist. In the evaluation, for the insecure
AES core on average 2,000 power traces are required to dis-
close a key byte. The AES in WDDL successfully protects
5 out of 16 key bytes up to 1,500,000 power traces; the 11
leaked bytes on average needs 255,000 traces each. The in-
creased security is at a cost of 3x increase in area, 4x increase
in power consumption and a limited operating speed up to
125MHz. The residual leakage of this WDDL design was due
to imperfect routing and the lack of IC design tool support
on security.
In theory, the power consumption of an SABL or WDDL
gate would be independent of the data values processed and
so thwart power analysis attacks. However in practical IC
design the capacitances of the complementary outputs are
impossible to be perfectly balanced due to all the compli-
cations in logic synthesis, placement, and routing. Even if
the most powerful IC design tool can make such a balance
at design time when the chips are being fabricated there are
still manufacture process variations that effectively break
the balance. Consequently, there are always residual leak-
ages and given sufficient number of power traces the secrets
6The authors claim this is the first practical DPA counter-
measure implemented and tested in actual silicon.
can still be extracted. A DES cryptoprocessor implemented
in FPGA using WDDL without place and route constraints
was successfully attacked by [SGD+09].
7.3 Masked Dual-Rail/Precharge Logic
The strong constraints in IC physical design for DRP logic
cells motivate research for more efficient solutions. Suzuki
et al., [SSI04] proposed the Random Switching Logic
(RSL) that combines the mask and the precharge, but it
uses single-rail logic. It introduces the precharge signal for
partially resisting glitches, and the random switching bit
(mask) is employed to avoid dual-rail and routing balance
constraints. An RSL gate satisfies two properties: 1) exe-
cutes masked operations for all input/output signals using
the same 1-bit random mask, 2) executes operations while
the precharge (like enable) is logic 1; otherwise the output
drives 0. For example a 2-input NAND/NOR gate in RSL is ex-
pressed by equation (12). The e signal is for precharge, and
the m is a 1-bit mask that switches the two functions ran-
domly. When m = 0, the RSL-NAND/NOR works as a regular
NAND and when m = 1 it works as a regular NOR. To encrypt
a data byte, the m bit is randomly generated and expanded
to a byte, XOR-ed with the input data byte, the round key
byte, fed into the protected circuit to switch logic roles, and
in the end XOR-ed with the masked output to get the real
encrypted value. Because the RSL gates do not confine to
positive monotonic functions, the design is not inherently
free of glitches. To ensure glitch-free, the precharge signals
must de-assert after all input data signals settle. Suzuki et
al., claims this can be achieved easily even by automatic
place-and-route tools if enough delay time is given.
RSL NAND/NOR : ym = e+ am · bm + (am + bm) ·m
with : am = a⊕m, bm = b⊕m, ym = y ⊕m
(12)
RSL gates do not have uniform switching activity as shown
in Table 1, but it intends to hide the data induced variations
by randomness. The authors of RSL evaluated their design
in FPGA and compared with a WDDL design7, the RSL
needs 1/3 of the area of WDDL with better timing perfor-
mance. Under DoM based attacks, the WDDL design leaks
with 60,000 traces but the RSL resists 200,000 queries.
Masked Dual-Rail Precharge Logic (MDPL) [PM05],
as its name explains, intends to combine merits of both mask
and DRP to halt DPA attacks and not pose any tedious
IC design constraints. The MDPL adopts dual-rail design
to have data-independent output switching activity and in-
tends to use a random mask bit to compensate for the loss
of routing balance. An MDPL AND gate takes six dual-rail
inputs (am, am, bm, bm, m, m) and produces two outputs
(ym, ym). The truth table is in Figure 9a and the outputs
are computed as ym = ((am ⊕ m) · (bm ⊕ m)) ⊕ m, and
ym = ((am ⊕m) · (bm ⊕m)) ⊕m (just for the truth table,
the implementation should not be done this way). From the
truth table, it is observed that the ym and ym can be com-
puted by the majority function (MAJ ) which outputs 1 if
7The WDDL design was implemented in the same FPGA,
but the authors did not mention any control in balancing
the WDDL loads.
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Figure 9: (a): The MDPL AND Gate Truth Table (b): The
MDPL AND Gate Schematic
the inputs have more 1s than 0s, or it outputs 0. A gate
that performs the majority function is supposed to exist in
a standard cell library. In MDPL, all signals are precharged
to 0 and similar to WDDL the precharge waves are launched
from registers and sweep all combinational logic. Since the
majority gate is a positive monotonic function, the MDPL
gates are immune to glitches. Moreover, because both the
dual-rail outputs can be computed by the same majority
function, MDPL has internally balanced current paths.
Like RSL, MDPL also uses a single-bit mask m (and its
complementary m) for each data byte encryption. MDPL
does not require balanced loads and routing constraints. The
imbalance is supposedly compensated by the random masks.
The authors simulated their design using a 0.35-µm standard
cell library, evaluated that by mounting DoM attacks on the
gate-level netlist power simulation and concluded the secret
key was not discovered. Compared to a regular but leaky
standard cell design, the MDPL version is 4.5x bigger in the
area and half the operating speed.
Although SABL, WDDL, RSL and MDPL are all designed
to be glitch-free, their implementation still can not prevent
different arrival times of signals that depend on cell and
route delays. Many of the normal boolean logic gates have
the property that their logical outputs can be uniquely de-
termined without necessarily knowing all the inputs. Ac-
cordingly a gate sometimes evaluates its logical output early,
before waiting for all of its logical inputs (not a timing vi-
olation). This shifted time of evaluation, called early prop-
agation (or early evaluation), causes data-dependent power
dynamics that are exploitable. Suzuki and Saeki [SS06] ex-
plained the leakage using WDDL and MDPL as examples.
They pointed that a cell that avoids early propagation must
delay the evaluation moment until all input signals have
arrived, e.g., all inputs of MDPL have settled to differen-
tial values. Popp et al., [PKZM07] confirmed the leakage
on a prototype MDPL chip and proposed improved MDPL
(iMDPL) to counteract early propagations. The remedy in
iMDPL significantly increased the area compared to MDPL.
For example, one more NAND, three more OR and six more NOR
gates were added to the MDPL AND gate in Figure 9b.
Tiri and Schaumont [TS07] found another source of leakage
in RSL and MDPL that is the mask bit itself. For example
in RSL, the encrypting process with m = 0 consumes more
(or less) power than the encrypting process with m = 1.
This is expected as the mask bit puts the circuit in one of
the two complementary forms. In other words, the distribu-
tion of samples in some columns of the power trace matrix P
already looks like Figure 3 with an observable notch in the
middle. Finding the time when the two distributions clearly
separate deserves some searching effort. Tiri and Schaumont
[ST07] suggest folding one part around the notch on top of
the other and then perform a regular DoM based attack.
Therefore, later research work often refers to this technique
as the folding attack. The authors used toggle count simula-
tion and proved the concept. Because the Gaussian curve is
a probability density function, using it to filter the mask bit
is called probability density function filtering. For MDPL, a
similar approach is applicable too. Practical folding attacks
on MDPL were reported by De Mulder et al., [DMGPV09]
on a prototype chip. Moradi et al., [MKEP12] further found
leakage in iMDPL using the folding attack and a few other
advanced mask detections methods. So once the mask effect
disappears from RSL or MDPL countermeasures, the circuit
downgrades to simple precharge or dual-rail logic without
balanced load capacitance and is susceptible to attacks.
7.4 Power Line Isolation
Alternative to manipulating the logic gates, another ap-
proach intends to isolate/decouple the cryptographic cir-
cuit’s power supply from the external voltage source. Shamir
[Sha00] introduced a power line decoupling method using
two capacitors that work in an alternating manner under a
proper switch control. During half the time, one capacitor
is charged by the external power source while the other ca-
pacitor is discharged by supplying the security chip. During
the other half of time, the two capacitors switch roles. Be-
cause the charges stored in the supplying capacitor can only
sustain a limited number of circuit operations, this paper
mainly discussed the feasibility of using a large capacitive
but separate circuit module for securing the protected chip.
Both can fit in the cavity of a smart card.
Since externally placed switch capacitors are easily tam-
pered by manipulating their pins, later developments fo-
cus on pushing them into the same chip. Corsonello et
al., [CPM06] proposed an integrated charge pump also us-
ing switches and capacitors. Although not evaluated under
practical attacks, the authors claimed a strong effectiveness
of their design based on simulation results.
Tokunaga and Blaauw [TB10] introduced a switching capac-
itor based current equalizer and practically evaluated that in
actual silicon. Figure 10a shows the design consisting three
switching capacitor modules, each having a 100-pF capacitor
CP for charge storage and three controlled pass-transistor
switches namely SSupply , SLogic , and SShunt . Each capacitor
module has three cyclic switching states: 1) Only SSupply
conducts and replenishes charge from the external supply,
2) Only SLogic is closed to provide charge for the protected
circuit, and 3) Only SShunt conducts and provides a path for
CP to discharge. The three modules have staggered switch-
ing pattern, shown in Figure 10b, to ensure uninterrupted
operation of the protected circuit. The storage capacitor
was implemented using a combination of NMOS and metal-
to-metal capacitors. During a discharge phase, its voltage is
monitored by a comparator, and when its voltage discharges
to a preset constant VRef , a trigger will open SShunt to stop
discharging. Thus VRef is to ensure no remainder variable
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Figure 10: (a): There Switching Capacitor Modules of
[TB10] (b): The Switching Pattern Diagram. Named blocks
indicate conducting of corresponding switches.
voltage is detectable at the beginning of the next charging
phase, and it prevents discharging to zero to save energy.
The test chip fabricated using a 0.13-µm CMOS process has
a switching capacitor protected AES core as well as a unpro-
tected one for practical comparison. The chip design flow
allows the AES core placed and routed using standard CAD
tools, and the current equalizer module is integrated after
that. Before fabrication, some mixed-signal circuit simula-
tion was performed to verify the correct operations. The
protected AES circuit did not leak any secret during CPA
attacks up to 10 million power traces while the insecure AES
core breaks at 10,000 measurements. The switching capac-
itor block incurs a 7.2% increase in the area, 33% increase
in the power consumption, and half the performance loss.
While [TB10] was designed as a bulk unit sitting aside the
protected circuit, Gornik et al., [GMOP15] bring switching
capacitors to individual logic gates. They pointed out two
issues of [TB10]: 1) its effectiveness depends on the quality
of switches, which in semiconductor is not perfect and their
sub-threshold currents in cutoff mode is exploitable by ad-
versaries. 2) the mixed-signal design flow is hardly reused for
other chips. To resolve the first problem, Gornik et al., im-
proved the external cutoff circuit (Figure 11) to reduce the
impact of sub-threshold currents in switches. Compared to
Figure 10a, the S1 and S3 switches work like the SSupply , the
S4 is equivalent to the SShunt , and the S2 and S5 switches
resemble the SLogic . S2 is the improvement to accommodate
sub-threshold currents of S1 and S3: when S1 and S3 are
open but leaking, S2 should effectively lead the currents to
ground to avoid crosstalk between Vdd and Vdd,Int .
For effortless integration in digital IC design, the switching
capacitors are compressed into a new standard cell and can
be distributed to each logic gate to supply it for several tran-
sitions. The concept is to design the decoupling cell once,
and it can be reused and compatible with automated layout
tools. However, using their target 0.15-µm CMOS technol-
ogy the decoupling cell was 259.78 µm2, 10x larger than a
2-input XOR gate of the standard cell library. Existing phys-
ical design tools did not support automated layout of such
decoupling cells, and so they performed manual placement
and routing of the test circuit which incurred only moder-
ate effort due to its small size. The authors anticipated the
area overhead could be reduced using a smaller technology
node, and they could use automation tools for future chip
layout. The detailed transistor-level design of the cell is in
[GMOP15] but the paper does not disclose specifications for
Figure 11: The Decoupling Circuit of [GMOP15]
CP , e.g., how large capacitance it should have.
Chips each having a protected S-Box of the PRESENT block
cipher were fabricated and evaluated. Under assessment, the
batch of chips from the same design, same wafer, and the
same package exhibited quite diverse resistance to DPA at-
tacks. Some of them showed a high level of robustness while
some of them provided nearly no protection. The authors
analyzed their chips, and they thought the reason was the
quality of chip bondings. They received the manufactured
dies unpackaged and performed packaging and wedge bond-
ing themselves. By repeating the bonding process for the
same test chip, they confirmed different results using the
same setup for power line attacks. The bonding issue was
expected to be resolved using advanced bonding machines.
Two things the recent publications did not precisely discuss
are: 1) the switch control signal generation, and 2) possible
leakage through non-power pins. A figure of the [TB10] pa-
per indicates it uses an on-chip ring oscillator for the switch
control clock generation and a programmable pattern gen-
erator for each switching capacitor module. The [GMOP15]
work exposed the switch controls to chip I/O pins and let
a microprocessor generate the control signals. Supposedly
the exposed control signals are for the testing chip only,
for practical defense they should be implemented on-chip
to avoid adversarial manipulations. Since a ring oscillator’s
frequency is sensitive to temperature, and so are the clock
skews to switches, it is unclear if switching capacitors would
leak information when their activities are not as well aligned
as shown in Figure 10b. Prior to [TB10] and [GMOP15],
Plos [Plo09] evaluated early designs using switching capaci-
tors and identified data-dependent information can also leak
through a device’s I/O pins (non-power pin), due to coupling
effects (crosstalk) where the switching activity of one wire
influences the voltage of neighboring wires. The [TB10] pa-
per did not address this problem; attack measurements were
only performed on a serial resistor in the chip’s Vdd supply
line. On the other hand [GMOP15] cited the Plos paper yet
still did not explicitly test their design’s I/O leakage. The
power measurements were performed by a current probe also
in the power line only.
7.5 Noise Generation
In the time dimension, the most commonly used techniques
are randomly inserting dummy instructions and shuffling the
order of operations, and as a result power traces are not
aligned anymore. For example, a microcontroller-based AES
cipher can insert random dummy instructions before and af-
ter the S-Box lookup, and the execution sequence of the 16
S-Boxes is different for each data block encryption. The
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price to pay for using dummy instructions is the through-
put of the cipher, and on the other hand shuffling does not
affect the throughput much but the operations that can ef-
fectively shuffle are limited. Multiple other approaches also
try to manipulate the clocks of the protected circuit, includ-
ing: 1) use clock gating technique to skip randomly clock
pulses [BLOW10], 2) randomly change the clock frequency
[PH+10] and phase [GM11], 3) use multiple clock domains
for different parts of the protected circuit [BVR+13]. An-
other form of temporal distortion coupled with voltage scal-
ing is discussed in Section 7.6.
For countermeasures that change the timing behavior of
power traces, it is critical that the attackers can not iden-
tify them. Dummy instructions such as NOPs have detectable
low power profile than others, and the attacker can quickly
filter them and restore the alignment of power traces. Due
to the limited degree of shuffling options, the right order of
segments in a power trace can be recovered by signal pro-
cessing. Pattern matching techniques are commonly used,
such as using a sliding window to perform correlation tests
on one power trace with respect to a reference. Clavier et
al., [CCD00] developed a sliding window based integration
method that can effectively attack shuffled power traces.
Newer and faster alignment techniques have also been pub-
lished such as the elastic alignment [VWWB11] and the
horizontal alignment [TH12]. In general, the insertion of
dummy instructions and shuffling do not provide a high level
of protection against power analysis. A technique to identify
changing clock frequencies is in Section 7.6.
In the amplitude dimension, the obvious goal is to increase
the noise variance V ar(Psw.noise + Pel.noise) so that the
SNR drops. Software, if possible, can run multiple inde-
pendent threads in parallel. Besides parallelism hardware
architecture also uses dedicated noise engines that perform
random switching activities while the cryptographic circuit
operates. A variety of ways can generate excess noise on
the chip. Le Masle et al., [LMCL11] use long wires with
many buffers along the route, and feed each wire with con-
trolled switching activities to draw currents in the buffers.
Gu¨neysu et al., [Gu¨n10] find in dual-ported memories write
contentions result in metastability within the storage cells
and lead to increased power consumption. They also devel-
oped a way to modify the Xilinx FPGA bitstream to gen-
erate controlled short circuits for a very limited amount of
time. It is important for noise creators to cover uniformly
the entire protected circuit but not only sit in a corner of
the chip. Cornered noises may only affect measurements
from nearby power lines, yet still leave backdoors in other
power/ground pins and electromagnetic emissions. Another
critical requirement for amplitude noises is they must have
the identical frequency spectrum as the exploitable power;
otherwise they are simply removed by a frequency filter.
Equation (10) shows the correlation coefficient in CPA is
proportional to
√
SNR, and so empirically added amplitude
noise results in quadratic number of power traces to get the
same attack outcomes. In practice, no countermeasure can
make noise variance to infinity, and for CPA only the rel-
ative amplitude of correlation coefficients matters not the
absolute. So amplitude noise is often considered ([MOP08]
and [GM11]) not an optimum way to thwart power side-
channel attacks. They play more assisting roles in defense.
7.6 Random Voltage and Frequency Scaling
The Dynamic Voltage and Frequency Scaling (DVFS) tech-
nique is generally used for digital systems to achieve power
efficiency. From the defense perspective, it could be random-
ized to halt power side-channel attacks. Compared to am-
plitude noises that mainly manipulate CL, scrambling both
Vdd and f is supposedly more efficient (Pdyn ∝ f ·CL · V 2dd).
Yang et al., [YWV+05] first introduced DVFS for counter-
acting DPA attacks. Their proposed cryptosystem consists
of three parts: 1) a cryptoprocessor, 2) a DVFS Feedback
Loop (DVFSL), and 3) a DVFS Scheduler (DVFSS). During
critical operations of the cryptoprocessor the DVFSS unit
randomly generates (Vdd, f) configurations and sends them
to the DVFSL, which implements the support for DVFS.
The DVFSL unit thereafter can apply the (Vdd, f) changes
to the cryptoprocessor with optional random delays in be-
tween. The authors proved their concept using a software
implementation of the DES cipher running by the Simple-
Power tool, an RTL power estimator. No actual power anal-
ysis attacks were mounted. Using custom metrics for power
trace properties the authors claimed the effectiveness of ran-
domized DVFS (RDVFS) as a DPA-resistant technique.
Figure 12: Frequency Detection [BZ07] of RDVFS. Bottom:
Simulated Power Traces with RDVFS. Top: The Predicted
Clock Frequencies.
Baddam et al., [BZ07] evaluated the concept of [YWV+05]
using more realistic experiment setup and actual DPA at-
tacks. They implemented an RDVFS-enabled AES (par-
tial) test circuit using an AMS 0.35-µm technology library
and run the SPICE netlist simulation without routing par-
asitics (for simulation speed). The simulated power traces
were then tested using DoM and CPA based attacks. In
the power traces, they notice distinguishable higher spikes,
each followed by a slope of setting down towards the next
one (Figure 12 Bottom). The reason is most transitions in a
sequential circuit happen right after clock edges and cause
a burst of currents. Therefore, the clock frequencies can be
sequenced by reading the spikes in the power traces (Fig-
ure 12 Top). Because in DVFS commonly there is a one-to-
one mapping between each operating voltage and frequency,
the voltages of RDVFS can be derived. The attacker then
scales power models accordingly and concludes successful
key extraction. This experiment also confirms that simply
manipulating clocks as temporal noises do not provide much
protection. Observing the limitations of RDVFS Baddam
et al., tried only to scale the voltage while keeping the fre-
quency constant. However for their experiment with 10,000
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encryption rounds the correlation strength was never below
a point where the key was undetectable.
Avirneni and Somani [AS13] tried to overcome the limita-
tions of RDVFS by introducing Aggressive Voltage Scaling
(AVS) and Aggressive Frequency Scaling (AFS). These tech-
niques break the one-to-one connection between Vdd and f .
For operating frequency beyond the timing margins, the au-
thors suggest self-correction circuit design. For the evalua-
tion, they set up SPICE simulation using one S-Box circuit
of AES and apply random (Vdd, f) pairs for collecting 10,000
power traces. The traces are evaluated by CPA based at-
tacks. The same experiment was repeated 500 times and
only two times the actual key had the strongest correlation.
DVFS shows potential for mitigating power side-channel at-
tacks but the results are still preliminary. For commercial
CPUs and FPGAs that already have DVFS support the ran-
dom DVFS methods should be feasible options. Otherwise,
the on-chip design of the voltage regulator, clock manage-
ment, and error-correction logic is not yet a trivial task for
custom ASICs.
7.7 Combining Countermeasures
It is widely accepted that a single countermeasure can not
effectively protect the security hardware against a variety of
side-channel attacks. Accordingly, a straightforward thought
is to combine protections. Unfortunately, some countermea-
sures do not simply add up, as explained by the folding
attack in Section 7.3. So choosing a combination of suitable
countermeasures is a rather challenging and tedious work
in practice. A positive example of using combined mitiga-
tions is proposed by Gu¨neysu et al., [GM11] for FPGAs.
They use signal masking, clock randomization, and ampli-
tude noise together for protection. The design could resist
a variety of first-order DPA attacks, with up to 100 million
power traces. Combining masked and precharge/dual-rail
logic gates is another popular direction. Besides the RSL
and MDPL, LUT-Masked Dual-Rail with Precharge Logic
(LMDPL) [LMW14] is the most recent tested hardware im-
plementation by the time of writing this survey. LMDPL
uses on gate-level masking, dual-rail precharge logic with-
out the need for routing constraints. It employs monotonic
gates to avoid glitches, and it fights against leakage of mask
bits and early propagation using a novel activity image anal-
ysis for combinational data paths. In its FPGA evaluation,
it shows no significant leaks up to 200 million power traces.
Obviously using multiple mitigations further increases the
circuit area, power, cost and complicates the design flow.
Improving the security level is never free and never perfect.
The cost and effort for the defense should match the value
of the device. For a chosen combination of mitigations, it
should still be used with corresponding key updating policies
to make allowed power trace queries of the same key within
its tolerance.
8. SUMMARY
Making a device resistant to power side-channel attacks is
not trivial. In academic publications, resistant logic styles
have been the most popular form of hardware countermea-
sures. Moreover, according to [MOP08] in the semiconduc-
tor industry, counteracting power side-channel attacks at
the cell level was one of the first reactions. It is reason-
able because logic styles are close to solving the information
leaks fundamentally in power traces. Hence, this survey
reviewed foundational designs using logic style countermea-
sure and their vulnerabilities. Since the exposure of flaws
in DPA-resistant logic styles, a large number of proposals
have been raised for improvements, at a higher cost of the
area, speed, and power. Some logic styles such as self-timed
(asynchronous) logic design [TMA+02] and current-mode
logic [AE01] are not discussed because they are not quite
compatible with contemporary mainstream IC design flows.
Although numerous logic style countermeasures exist, each
of them features a unique set of overheads and constraints.
The lack of security support in CAD tools has limited the
implementation of many defensive circuit techniques. Hard-
ware defenders have to swap gates, use customized routers
and dictate existing tools for specialized layout requirements.
Moreover extra effort on functional and timing verification
has been incurred for secure implementations. To circum-
vent complications in the design flow the rest countermea-
sures are engaged with separate objects to relax the con-
straints, for example, random number generators, clocks,
and voltage regulators that themselves must be tamper-
resistant. Once random numbers are biased, or clock sources
are compromised, it is anticipated that corresponding coun-
termeasures are weakened. Table 2 summarizes the potential
vulnerabilities in existing hardware countermeasures. The
report aims to provide a survey of exposed vulnerabilities in
hardware-based countermeasures, and serve as a reference
for future more secure IC implementations.
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APPENDIX
A. THE AES CIPHER
The AES [Nat01] block cipher encrypts 128 bits fixed block
size of data, using a cipher key that can be either 128, 192 or
256 bits long. The differences between the uses of the three
key sizes are the number of encryption/decryption rounds
and the key expansion process. The three different AES key
sizes use 10, 12, and 14 rounds respectively. This paper
mainly discusses the AES-128 version that uses a 128-bit
cipher key.
A.1 The Round Functions
Each round of the AES encryption comprises of four different
functions, named as AddRoundKey, SubBytes, ShiftRows,
and MixColumns. The 128-bit data being operated in each
round contains 16 bytes {D1, D2, · · · , D16}, known as the
state. An AES state is stored as intermediate values in mem-
ory units for subsequent transformations. The encryption
process of one data block starts with the plaintext state
and performs an initial AddRoundKey operation. Then nine
rounds are executed, and each round sequentially performs
SubBytes, ShiftRows, MixColums, and AddRoundKey on
the state. After that, a last round is executed with only
three functions: SubBytes, ShiftRows, and AddRoundKey.
The encryption flow of AES is in Figure 13, and each func-
tion of an AES round is briefly explained below.
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Figure 13: The AES Encryption
AddRoundKey: In AES-128 a round key is also a 128-bit
value that is derived from the cipher key by the key expan-
sion algorithm. Round keys are different in each round. The
AddRoundKey function performs a bitwise XOR (Di ⊕Xi,
i ∈ [1 · · · 16]) of a state byte Di and a corresponding round
key byte Xi. Note that the round key used in the initial
AddRoundKey operation is identical to the cipher key.
S(Yi) = A · Y −1i + b (13)
SubBytes: Also known as the S-Box, this function is to
perform byte substitution on each byte of the state inde-
pendently after the AddRoundKey operation. The function
(13) for each state byte (Yi) is to compute its multiplicative
inverse (Y −1i ) in the finite field of GF (2
8), followed by an
affine transform. Definitions of binary matrix A and vector
b are given by [Nat01]. Due to the computational complex-
ity of finite field inversions and matrix multiplications, the
S-Box is often precomputed as a lookup table and stored in
memories for quick reference in each round.
ShiftRows: This transformation views the 16 state bytes
as a 4 × 4 array and performs cyclic left shifts for each row
of the state bytes. The first state row is not shifted, the
second row is shifted to the left by one byte position, the
third row is shifted by two byte positions and the fourth
row is shifted by three.
MixColumns: This column-wise function provides further
mixing of bytes in a state. It produces a new state column
using a constant matrix defined by AES to multiply a pre-
vious state column.
The state gets updated by each round function, and after
ten rounds of transformations the initial 128-bit plaintext is
turned into the 128-bit ciphertext. More plaintext bits are
encrypted in the same way as 128-bit data blocks. The AES
decryption process executes the inverse of these functions
in reversed order, using the same cipher key. The com-
plete specification of the AES is in the FIPS-197 document
[Nat01]. The provided information in this section should
suffice most discussions covered in the survey.
The SubBytes function has the property that small changes
in its input produce large differences in the output, and vise
versa. Therefore, most power analysis attacks target the
S-Box input or output because wrong key guesses lead to
clearly distinguishable S-Box outputs compared to the ac-
tual values. In contrast, cryptographically weak functions
such as the AddRoundKey are more resistant to power anal-
ysis because similar key guesses result in small variations in
these functions.
A.2 The Cipher Implementations
The AES cipher can be efficiently implemented in either
software or hardware. Many smart cards have software im-
plementations using 8051, PIC or ARM family microcon-
trollers [RE10]. A simple microprocessor with 8-bit data
paths does not create any significant limitations for run-
ning the AES algorithm. Some modern smart cards could
also use 32-bit microprocessors for advanced features such as
running Java programs. For ultra low-power, performance,
and some security advantages, hardware implementations of
cipher modules are also found available. Instead of stored
lookup tables, the S-Box can also be efficiency implemented
in hardware using finite field arithmetic [WOL02]. There
is usually more parallelism in the hardware implementation
than in software. For example, up to 16 S-Boxes can be
executed simultaneously, while an 8-bit microcontroller can
only process one byte after another. Both software and hard-
ware ciphers often lack countermeasures for power analysis
attacks unless specially designed for such purposes.
The cipher was designed to resist algorithmic breaking at-
tempts: brute-forcing 2128 guesses is computationally pro-
hibitive. However despite its software or hardware imple-
mentations, it is obvious that its internal computations of-
ten operate on smaller data widths than 128 bits, especially
the S-Box function that only works on 8-bit chunks inde-
pendently. It should be emphasized that these intermediate
values are exactly on target in power analysis attacks, and
their short length in bits greatly reduces the effort of ex-
haustive testing.
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